Introduction

Civil asset forfeiture is a legal process that authorizes the confiscation of property suspected of having been used for, or derived from, criminal activity. Because the action is against the property itself, there is no need to convict the owner of the underlying crime. Indeed, the owner does not even need to be charged. And because it is a civil rather than a criminal action, the link between the property and the crime does not need to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt; a “preponderance of the evidence” is sufficient.

Civil asset forfeiture is inherently unjust. It violates property rights and the right to due process. Worst of all, it perverts the proper relationship between the police and the public by turning the former into predators and the latter into their prey. Despite these defects, the federal government started making extensive use of the practice in the 1970s, and in the years that followed, most states enacted similar civil asset forfeiture laws of their own.

Fortunately, North Carolina did not go along with that national trend. Under North Carolina’s criminal asset forfeiture statutes, property linked to a crime is subject to forfeiture only after the property’s owner has been convicted of that crime. And under the North Carolina State Constitution, asset forfeiture proceeds do not revert to the agency that made the seizure. Instead, they must be used for maintaining public schools.

These features of North Carolina law protect the innocent and discourage abuse and have been awarded high marks in repeated editions of the Institute for Justice’s “Policing for Profit” report. In 2015, they also earned North Carolina the top score in a report by FreedomWorks titled “Civil Asset Forfeiture: Grading the States.”

Unfortunately, a federal program called “equitable sharing” makes it possible for North Carolina law enforcement agencies to circumvent these protections.

One form of equitable sharing is relatively benign. A state or local law enforcement agency that participates with a federal agency in a joint investigation receives a share of the proceeds from any assets seized in the course of the investigation. The fact that those assets can be taken through civil asset forfeiture is unfortunate, but at least joint investigations serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose.

The second form of equitable sharing, which is known as “adoption,” is worse. When a state law enforcement agency refers seized assets to a federal agency for adoption, those assets are processed under federal civil asset forfeiture law, and the bulk of the proceeds are then returned to the state agency that made the seizure. Adoptions serve only one purpose: to facilitate the circumvention of state asset forfeiture laws.

Key Facts

  • North Carolina’s statutes and the state constitution protect the innocent and discourage abuse by requiring a criminal conviction before property can be forfeited and by requiring forfeiture proceeds to be used for maintaining public schools.
  • The federal government’s equitable sharing program makes it possible for North Carolina law enforcement agencies to circumvent those protections.
  • More than 100 agencies in North Carolina, including the State Bureau of Investigation and the Highway Patrol, regularly process seized assets through the equitable sharing program. Between 2000 and 2019, those agencies collected almost $300 million in equitable sharing proceeds.
  • Eight states and the District of Columbia have imposed restrictions on equitable sharing. They include prohibiting federal adoptions and requiring that a monetary threshold be met before asset sharing is permitted in joint investigations.

Recommendations

1. Ban federal adoptions completely.

This form of equitable sharing exists only to circumvent North Carolina’s well-considered civil asset forfeiture law.

2. Limit asset takings.

Forbid state law enforcement agencies from sharing the proceeds of assets seized in the course of joint investigations if the value of those assets is less than $100,000. While joint investigations serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, taking assets through civil asset forfeiture should be limited.

Total Equitable Sharing Proceeds In North Carolina

YearNorth Carolina Forfeiture RevenuesDOJ Equitable Sharing ProceedsTreasury Equitable Sharing ProceedsTotal Equitable Sharing Proceeds
2000None Reported$7,125,291$1,018,000$8,143,291
2001None Reported$6,808,539$754,000$7,562,539
2002None Reported$4,581,800$1,632,000$6,213,800
2003None Reported$9,480,431$899,000$10,379,431
2004None Reported$8,536,628$720,000$9,256,628
2005None Reported$10,121,517$3,802,000$13,923,517
2006None Reported$10,817,405$2,675,000$13,492,405
2007None Reported$20,920,094$2,734,000$23,654,094
2008None Reported$17,964,512$6,888,000$24,852,512
2009None Reported$15,445,754$7,081,000$22,526,754
2010None Reported$10,600,785$3,276,000$13,876,785
2011None Reported$10,603,162$2,761,000$13,364,162
2012None Reported$15,563,496$4,108,000$19,671,496
2013None Reported$12,763,130$5,002,000$17,765,130
2014None Reported$10,805,901$5,736,000$15,541,901
2015None Reported$11,883,462$3,651,000$15,534,462
2016None Reported$8,709,152$5,480,000$14,189,152
2017None Reported$9,256,927$1,915,000$11,171,927
2018None Reported$17,116,834$2,237,000$19,353,834
2019None Reported$11,277,342$1,019,000$12,296,342
Totals$0$230,382,162$63,388,000$293,770,162

Note: All revenue figures include both civil and criminal forfeitures. Revenues are not adjusted for inflation. Source: Institute for Justice.

Status of Anti-Circumvention Laws Across the U.S.

Source: John Locke Foundation