The North Carolina Supreme Court recently issued its opinion in a case called Jones v Keller.  In a 5-2 opinion, the Court held that a prisoner (Alford Jones) serving a “life” sentence (defined as 80 years) was not unlawfully imprisoned regardless of the good behavior credits he earned.

Facts

– Life sentences between April 8, 1974 and June 30, 1978 were statutorily defined as 80 years. This is the sentence applicable to Jones.

– Department of Correction (DOC) regulations define good time, gain time, and merit time (for simplicity sake, “good behavior”) credits as (according to the Court):

“[t]ime credits applied to an inmate’s sentence that reduce [] the amount of time to be served” and state that “[g]ood time is sentence reduction credits awarded, at the rate of one day deducted for each day served in custody for good behavior and/or without an infraction of inmate conduct rules.”

Analysis

There’s nothing confusing about this.  Jones was sentenced to serve 80 years and the length of his sentence was supposed to be offset by these “good behavior” credits.

So how did the Court conclude otherwise: through the use of judicial activism.

1) The DOC argued that the credits were never meant to determine unconditional release dates, but to calculate parole eligibility, and other matters.

Where exactly does it say that in the plain language of the DOC’s own regulations?  It doesn’t.

2) Even if the law does say that Jones should be released, the Court argued that the state has a compelling reason not to release him because he would endanger public safety (he was convicted of first-degree murder).

The fact that they are even weighing his rights to the public safety is an indication of how weak the Court’s argument is regarding the proper applicability of the credits.

The Court apparently believes we can take away fundamental rights if it is in the greater good–a scary proposition. In this case, Jone’s liberty interests are being violated (even though he is a prisoner) and the actions amount to an ex post facto law. See Weaver v. Graham 450 U.S. 24.*

In this balancing test, the Court presumes that Jones is having his rights violated and is entitled to be released but the state interest is more compelling. What about other prisoners? Does this mean a criminal sentence is subject to change whenever a government agency thinks it would be best not to release that individual?

Since I don’t want to write a law review article on this, I highly recommend reading Justice Timmons-Goodson’s dissent.

She sums up the case well when she wrote:

This case arises out of a mistake of law by the DOC that it now seeks to rectify through unwritten, retrospective policy pronouncements some thirty-five years after the fact.

One more excerpt:

Today?s decision offends common notions of fundamental fairness.  For thirty years, Jones has behaved well, participated in prison work release and study programs, and otherwise performed the conditions necessary to earn sentence reduction credits.  Now the State refuses to grant Jones the benefit of his efforts. And although the majority claims the DOC does not have ?carte blanche? over the administration of prisoners? sentences, the rejection of Jones?s fundamental liberty interests in favor of the DOC?s ?interpretation? of an unwritten and heretofore unarticulated practice is a departure from established principles. One wonders what other unwritten policies the DOC operates under and whether they, too, are supported by law. Today?s decision condones spontaneous rule-making by the DOC that targets individuals retroactively, thereby abdicating this Court?s role as a protector of Constitutional liberty rights.

This decision may be politically popular but it is precisely the type of case that undermines the legitimacy of the judiciary. The Court is supposed to interpret laws, no matter how ignorant they may be.

Note: Don’t read this note unless you want to get into the weeds: An ex post facto law applies to laws enacted after a crime has been committed–it is not absolutely clear how these
good faith credits applied when Jones committed his crime.  I didn’t find anything in the opinion to suggest that such credits didn’t apply at the time of the crime (although the regulations had been changed several times according to the Court). If however the credits didn’t apply, then it would make the ex post facto law argument more difficult (if not inapplicable).